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1 Introduction
There is little doubt that economic agents are di⁄erentially informed about
some things that are quite important to them. For example, David Halber-
stam￿ s classic, The Best and the Brightest, describes how the McNamara-led
cost cutters at Ford in the 1950s worked to reverse engineer the construction
of Chevrolets, which was the market leader produced by General Motors at
the time.
"The night each year when they got hold of their ￿rst Chevy,
everyone gathered around in a special room and broke it down
piece by piece into hundreds of items, each one stapled to a place
already laid out for it, and they concentrated on it ￿no brain
surgeon ever concentrated more ￿every one wondering how Chevy
had done this or that for a tenth of a cent less, cursing them
slightly ￿so that was how they had done it!"
Information about a trading partner￿ s conditions, a competitor￿ s prod-
ucts and pricing, market demand, and about aggregate economic activity
are all plausibly di⁄erent across agents. The central question for macro-
economics is whether such information heterogeneity just averages out ￿as
in Muth￿ s (1961) setting where individuals suppliers are simply assumed to
have expectations that di⁄er from the average in idiosyncratic manner which
Muth describes as "distributed around the predictions of the theory" ￿or
whether information heterogeneity in￿ uences the nature of ￿ uctuations in
the economy.
The interest in informational equilibrium models was lively in the late
1970s and early 1980s, then was dormant until the last ￿ve years or so.
Having worked on this class of problems in my dissertation, before turning to
other topics, I am delighted to have the opportunity to discuss this interesting
and valuable paper by George-Marios Angeletos and Jennifer La￿ O (hence-
forth, AL) that is both representative of recent developments and breaks
interesting new ground.
AL develop a tractable economic environment which features important
strategic complementarity between quantity actions across locations of eco-
nomic activity and signi￿cant information heterogeneity across agents. They
1use this framework to show how these two structural elements lead to impor-
tant macroeconomic e⁄ects of noise in public signals, which is an interesting
substantive hypothesis. In particular, they argue that when agents are dif-
ferentially informed, it can be the case that noise is far more important for
the business cycle than fundamentals.
Relative to the bulk of the earlier literature that simply postulated sup-
ply and demand functions, along with particular welfare criteria, the recent
literature ￿as exempli￿ed by AL ￿is develops "noisy business cycle" results
in the context of a fully speci￿ed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models, so that internal consistency is imposed so that it is feasible to con-
duct welfare analysis. When AL do so, with exogenous public signals, they
conclude that business cycle outcomes are information-constrained e¢ cient,
even in settings where there is a large e⁄ect of noise. To reach this conclu-
sion, they establish that decentralized market outcomes are e¢ cient under
perfect competition. Turning to the more general case that is used in much
of modern macroeconomics, they further argue that monopolistic competi-
tion only has the e⁄ect of shifting down the level of economic activity, so
that the business cycle ￿ uctuations are identical under imperfect competi-
tion and perfect competition, but they cannot further establish the e¢ ciency
properties of the overall equilibrium.
In my discussion, I will consider four topics that seem important in future
work in the area, which I was stimulated to think about by their work: (i) the
analysis of optimal policy in a simple imperfect competition macroeconomic
model contained within their setup; (ii) the microeconomic implications of
a technology shock version of their noisy business cycle model; (iii) the em-
pirical investigation and associated interpretation of noise in this class of
models; and (iv) the e¢ ciency of imperfect information models of economic
￿ uctuations.
Before turning to this discussion, I congratulate the authors on producing
a fully articulated framework for the analysis of noisy business cycles. The
clarity of their presentation in this and in other related papers, substantially
reduces the cost of "reverse engineering" the models in the modern literature
while making it feasible to push this research program forward. I have little
doubt that many of the young "best and brightest" in macroeconomics will
continue to move this program forward along the paths outlined in this paper.
22 Policy design with imperfect competition
A core contribution of the work by Angeletos and La￿ O is an explicit welfare
analysis of real business cycles in a model with heterogeneous information
and with imperfect competition, an activity made possible by their careful
construction of a model with microeconomic foundations. There is a striking
result in their corollary 3: decentralized market outcomes are information-
constrained e¢ cient under perfect competition. With the additional restric-
tion that there are no markup shocks, their corollary 4 indicates that "the
business cycle is e¢ cient in the sense the gap... between the equilibrium and
the e¢ cient level of output is invariant".
In this part of my discussion, working by example, I suggest that there
may be an e¢ ciency property for such economies if there are restrictions on
government instruments, which in turn may be rationalized more deeply as
restrictions on the information held by a social planner. To do so, I exploit the
fact that there is a simple well-known example of an imperfect competition
macroeconomic model nested within the AL setup. This arises when there is
























where j is the index of ￿rms (as in AL) and ￿ < 0 is the elasticity of demand
All ￿rms purchase the sole factor of production labor in a market at wage
rate w. Each ￿rm has a production function of the form1
q(j) = An(j)
All ￿rms face the same level of productivity, which may be a random variable
as it is in AL. The aggregator above implies that each ￿rm faces a demand
1Note that AL use the more general production function of the form q(j) = An(j)￿
with 0 < ￿ < 1. I specialize to the case of ￿ = 1 because diminishing return raises the





when its relative price is p(j).
2.1 Policy instruments and policy design
To think about optimal policy, we need to specify the available instruments
and enforcement mechanisms that the government has at its disposal. Sup-
pose that the government has three potential instruments: a subsidy to ￿rm
production at rate s, a labor income tax at rate ￿w and a lump sum pro￿ts
tax ￿￿. Hence, ￿rm pro￿ts are




and households have a budget constraint of the form




￿(j)dj is the pro￿t ￿ ow from all ￿rms.
2.2 Imperfect competition equilibria
Firms are monopolistic competitors, so that they set a price which is a






￿ > 1 being the "gross markup".






That is, the equilibrium pre-tax wage rate depends positively on the subsidy
and productivity, but negatively on the markup.
4Firms earn a ￿ ow of pro￿ts proportional to their output (q(j) = c(j) = c
in symmetric equilibrium), which is given by








Households equate the marginal rate of substitution between work and




= w(1 ￿ ￿w)















with n￿ and c￿ being the ￿rst-best values.2 In terms of welfare, equilibria
have u < u￿ if
w(1￿￿w)
A < 1.
2.3 Optimal policy with all instruments
The ￿rst best outcome can be supported in a decentralized imperfectly com-
petitive equilibrium if 1 + s = ￿ and ￿w = 0. Intuitively, this involves the
social planner and private agents each seeing the same reward to work, A.
In such an equilibrium, before-tax monopoly pro￿ts are




The required subsidy payments are just sc, so that the necessary subsidy
plan would be self-￿nancing if all monopoly pro￿ts are taxed away.











￿+" and c￿ = An￿.
52.4 Optimal policy without lump-sum taxes
Alternatively, one might consider a situation in which there are no e⁄ectively
lump sum taxes on ￿rms or households (￿￿ = 0), so that subsidies must be
￿nanced with labor income taxes. In this setting, the household views the
net reward to labor in equilibrium as




and the government budget constraint is
sc = ￿wwn.
The latter implies that
(1 ￿ ￿w)(1 + s) = 1 + s(1 ￿ ￿)
when combined with w = 1+s
￿ A and c = An.3 Hence, any increase in the
subsidy will have the e⁄ect of reducing the incentive to supply labor (1 ￿
￿w)(1 + s) relative to the nonintervention situation of s = ￿w = 0.
2.5 Implication and a conjecture
The example economy displays the property that AL stress in their welfare
analysis: the real business cycle ￿ uctuations (induced by shifts in A) are
identical to those under optimal policy, even though the level of consumption
and work is lower due to monopoly distortions.
3Derivation footnote for RK













= 1 + s(1 ￿ ￿)
6However, under the restriction that there are no pro￿ts taxes, these ￿ uc-
tuations around a lower level of activity are e¢ cient from the standpoint
of a social planner. There thus could be an alternative formulation of the
constraints on the planner in the more general AL model which would lead
to the conclusion that most equilibria are information-constrained e¢ cient,
for a government with a limited set of policy instruments (a planner with an
alternative set of implementation constraints).
3 Microeconomic implications
A hallmark of modern business cycle models is that there are implications
for microeconomic activity, as well as macroeconomic activity. This places
an important discipline on aggregate model building. It is also the case that
the parameters of macroeconomic models are identi￿ed from aggregate time
series data.
3.1 Introducing strategic complementarity
Angeletos and La￿ O have a very slick way of incorporating strategic com-
plementarity with respect to beliefs which this channel to be separated from
monopoly power that is a more standard source of complementarity in macro-
economics. That is, they view goods from various "islands" as bundled to-














so that the parameter ￿ governs the strength of complementarity across is-
lands, which are informationally heterogeneous. They additionally allow for















so that the monopolistic competition mechanism is present as well.
73.2 Reduced form
Focusing on a special case with constant returns to scale production and
limiting attention to productivity shocks of a Gaussian form, the AL model
provides an exact loglinear speci￿cation in which island-speci￿c output de-
pends on island-speci￿c productivity and on the island￿ s belief about aggre-
gate economic activity,
logqit = (1 ￿ ￿)￿logAit + ￿Eit[logQt]
where qit is local output, Ait is the local productivity shock and Qt is ag-
gregate economic activity, governed by logQt =
Z
i
logqit. Note that, for
simplicity, I am ignoring the constant term in this equation.




where " is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and ￿ is the
elasticity of the marginal disutility of e⁄ort.







so that variation in the "macro elasticity" ￿ can be used to vary ￿, while
holding ￿xed the RBC forces (￿;"). The product di⁄erentiation parameter
￿ plays no role in either of these compound parameters, ￿guring only in the
omitted constant term.
3.3 Full information: macro implication
A convenient feature of the AL model is that the parameter ￿ plays no role in







8Accordingly, when exploring the e⁄ects of ￿ on the properties of "noisy
business cycles", AL can hold the properties of full information business
cycles constant. This makes for conceptually clean experiment: the macro
e⁄ects of the strategic complementarity parameter ￿ operate entirely via
incomplete information channels.
3.4 Local market activity
However, it is not the case that all properties of the stochastic equilibrium
are invariant to the degree of strategic complementarity as controlled by ￿.
Consider the deviation of local output from aggregate output in a particular
market k.





Under common information (including complete information), the last line
of this expression is zero, so that it is useful to initially specialize to this case.
An increase in strategic complementarity ￿ reduces the responsiveness of
local activity to the local productivity shock [logAkt￿logAt]. Hence, there is
a tension between using strategic complementarity to generate macro volatil-
ity, while maintaining a given degree of micro volatility of shocks (variability
of [logAkt ￿ logAt]) and a given strength of the RBC mechanisms (￿).
This tension is a pervasive one in macroeconomics, so that it is perhaps
reassuring that it appears here. But it means that a full information version
of the AL model that was taken to both macro and micro data would place
restrictions on the degree of strategic complementarity.
More generally, the volatility of logqkt ￿ logQt depends on the volatility
of [Ekt logQt ￿
Z
i
Eit logQt] as well as its covariance with [logAkt ￿ logAt].
To generate high amplitude response to a local shock, with a high level
of the complementarity parameter ￿, there would need to be a particular
comovement of local beliefs and local shocks, in ways that would depend on
the details of the informational equilibrium. In a sense, there would need to
be micro noise e⁄ects as well as macro noise e⁄ects.
94 What￿ s noise?
In the AL model, noise in public signals is an important, potentially dominant
source of business cycle ￿ uctuations. Continuing to work within the special
case discussed in the previous section, aggregate output is




That is, if the typical market thinks aggregate economic activity will be
higher, in the sense of
Z
i
Eit logQt increasing, then aggregate economic ac-
tivity will be increased, with a strength of this e⁄ect depending on ￿. With
￿ close to one, the volatility of aggregate output is due principally to the
volatility of "average opinion" and noise in public signals is a rational expec-
tations mechanism for shifting expectations without shifting fundamentals.
But what is noise? Future research in this area will have to take a stand
on the details of the information structure and the nature of noise, measuring
its properties.
4.1 Monetary misperceptions
In the literature on monetary nonneutrality due to imperfect information
(stemming from Lucas (1972)), one strand of the literature examined the im-
plications of observable monetary information for real activity. As an exam-
ple, consider the following basic model that links output (y) to misperceived
money







Ezt logMt is average opinion across a set of local markets and ￿ is
a positive coe¢ cient.
Monetary statistics, f Mt, can be viewed as the true money stock Mt plus a
measurement error, &t. As discussed in King (1981), such a Lucas-style model
implies that output should be uncorrellated with monetary statistics, even
10if these the are measured with error relative to behaviorally relevant money
stock (Mt). This is a direct implication of the general point that expectation
errors should not be correlated with available information. But the model also
has implications for the impact of noise in such public signals if a measure of
noise can be constructed. For example, suppose that expectation formation
takes the form, Z
z
Ezt logMt = ￿f Mt + :::
with 0 < ￿ < 1. That is, an increase in the observed monetary statistic
will raise average opinion given other determinants of expectations. In this
setting, an increase in actual money will raise output, since
yt = ￿[Mt ￿ ￿f Mt + :::]
= ￿[(1 ￿ ￿)Mt ￿ ￿&t] + :::




￿xed behaviorally relevant money Mt. Studies of revisions in money stock
statistics by Barro and Hercovitz (1980) and Boschen and Grossman (1983)
did not ￿nd the noise e⁄ects predicted by the theory.
More recent work by Collard and Dellas (2007) suggests that there are
important quantitative e⁄ects of mismeasured money during the "monetarist
experiment" of the late 1970s and early 1980s. They also ￿nd that noise
e⁄ects can be important for the dynamic implications of model which combine
imperfect information and sticky prices.
However the ultimate empirical results on "monetary misperceptions"
ultimately turn out, the work in this area illustrates one way to measure
noise and to determine its e⁄ects on macroeconomic activity.
4.2 Noise as belief shifts
AL take an alternative view of noise, which can is both richer and more agnos-
tic: noise is simply a "convenient modeling device for introducing correlated
errors in beliefs of aggregate fundamentals".
With such a perspective, there seem to be two main implications in terms
of taking models of this class to data. First, while errors across agents
could well be correlated at a point in time, they should be uncorrellated
11with information held by agents. Second, the identi￿cation of these noise
events will likely come about via the cross-equation restrictions of a particular
model: an identi￿ed belief will be one that produces a particular pattern of
comovement at a point in time and a particular evolution of the economy￿ s
path.
From this perspective, the illustrative analyses undertaken by AL indi-
cate the potential empirical content of the theory. Taking as given the real
structure of the economy, the information structure of the economy will con-
tribute some additional free parameters that will have implications for how
the real economy responds to standard shocks as well as how measures of
beliefs evolve through time. The noise events themselves are an additional
source of shocks. Explorations of identi￿cation in these models appears to
be a ￿rst order matter.
5 Information and Policy
There are a number of settings in which there is a divergent private and social
value of information, which can rationalize particular policy interventions.
One that is well understood by Angeletos and La￿ O, but bears stressing, is
that agents plausibly learn from prices and other endogenous signals.
In Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), individuals whether to acquire infor-
mation about underlying fundamentals. In equilibrium, there is generally
too little production of information because agents do not take into account
the bene￿ts that accrue to others when deciding on whether to become in-
formed. A similar logic presumably applies when individuals are deciding on
the precision of signals to acquire.
In models of monetary policy, when agents learn from commonly observed
prices (as in Weiss (1980) and King (1982)), policy can a⁄ect the informa-
tion content of such prices. That is: policy can a⁄ect the weight that agents
place on the endogenous and exogenous signals, as well as exerting more
standard income and substitution e⁄ects. The earlier generation of models
also suggested the possibility that there can be more than one incomplete
information equilibrium (more than one con￿guration of "signal extraction
parameters" in noisy rational expectations models), as, for example, in the
local product and global bond market analysis of King (1983). Policy pa-
rameters in such models can alter the information content of prices in ways
that reduce the set of noisy rational expectations equilibria.
12Turning to the broader linkage between information and policy, we know
from the work of Prescott and Townsend (1984) that there is a rich set of
environments in which competitive equilibria are Pareto e¢ cient when in-
dividuals have private information. It would be useful to work to extend
the welfare analysis of AL to environments that combined individual private
information with incomplete information about aggregate conditions. We
know also from the work of Kahn and Mukherjee (1988) that competitive
equilibria can lose their e¢ ciency properties when incentive constraints con-
tain macro quantities or prices. This suggests that the suggested extension
is an important, but subtle one.
6 Concluding comments
I think that the mechanisms stressed by Angeletos and La￿ O are potentially
important for business ￿ uctuations, but that there is much work to be done
to measure this importance. We need quantitative models in which the
e⁄ects of noise are speci￿ed and the empirical models in in￿ uence of noise is
evaluated.
While I am intellectually sympathetic (perhaps nostalgically so), I am far
from sure that the mechanisms is the most important types of information for
macroeconomics. Recent events put the question starkly. I interpret the class
of models advocated by AL as suggesting that economic activity has been low
and volatile because the path of aggregate demand is hard for an individual
agent to determine, given that it is in￿ uenced by the beliefs of others. A
much discussed alternative vision stresses asymmetric information in bilateral
or multilateral relationships as a source of ampli￿cation mechanisms, such
as in lending relationships. A ￿nal vision suggests that private sector beliefs
about government policy responses have played a central role in the recent
boom and bust.
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